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Chapter 9 
The Role of Trust in 
the Long-Run Development 
of French Financial Markets 
PHILIP T. HOFFMAN, GILLES POSTEL-VINAY, 
AND JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL 
U SING HISTORICAL DATA, we test whether social capital generates trust in past financial markets and whether the effects of hust per-sist across time, The evidence for the tests comes from 108 credit 
markets in France over nearly two centuries. We find that social capital 
had no significant effect on trust in these credit markets and that this trust 
must have changed over time. The implication is that trust in financial 
markets is an intermediate variable that evolves rather quickly so long as 
societies are not pathological. 
Trust, it has long been argued, can facilitate economic h·ansactions that 
make people better off and thereby have an enormous impact on economic 
growth (Arrow 1972). Trust ought to have such an effect, if it means that 
people can invest without spending a great deal to keep from being 
defrauded. And its consequences should be particulady important in finan-
cial markets, for investors inevitably put their money in other people's 
hands. 
There is some evidence that trust does work this '-Vay. A measure of 
trust taken from questionnaires is correlated with more rapid economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer 1997). It also seems to explain individuals' 
Willingness to invest in financial markets that cannot be traced back to dif-
ferences in their wealth or their attitudes toward dsk and ambiguity 
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2005). But what in turn determines trust? 
It is usually presumed to reflect some form of social capital, such as norms 
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that discourage abuses of trust or social networks that facilitate ptmish-
ment of untrustworthy behavior. The usual (though not universal) assump-
tion is that this social capital will change very slowly, if at all, in a given 
society, but it will vaiy a great deal .fron1 place to place.1 The same Will 
therefore be true of h·ust. And there is considerable evidence from surveys 
and experiments that social capital and trust do in fact vary across soci-
eties and even within regions of a single com1hy (Putnam, Leonardi, and_ 
Nanetti 1993; Henrich et al., 2004; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004, 
2006). There is also evidence that the two are linked in financial markets 
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zh1gales 2004, 2005). 
If trust is generated by social capital and if it does in turn significantly 
affect financial markets, then its effects should be visible both today and 
in the past. More social capital, be it stronger norms to discotuage fra1id 
or more effective networks to punish deviants, will mean more hust and 
hence-if other things are equal-more lending and invcsbnent, no 
matter what the year. And if social capital changes slowly, then so will 
trust, and the effects of trust on lending or investment will remain the 
same over long periods. 
As yet, no one has subjected this argument to a thorough statistical test.2 
In particular, no one has verified-at least quantitatively-that the relation-
ship between trust and social capital holds in the past or that the effects 
of trust persist over time. The statistical evidence usually advanced in 
favor of hust mattering and of its being generated by enduring social cap-
ital simply cannot speak to this issue, because it all comes from current 
day observations-experiments, modern surveys, and cross-sectional 
regressions-and thus cannot answer questions about the past or about 
change over time. Historical evidence would be an obvious way to see 
1vhether the relationships observed today bear up over long periods, but 
no one has ever subjected them to the right sort of statistical scrutiny. 
The omission is hardly a matter of mere antiquarian interest, because 
it raises fundamental questions about trust, social capital, and even about 
policy. If the sort of relationship between social capital and financial 
development that we see today were to end up disappearing in the past, 
we would in fact have to rethink what trust in financial markets might be. 
We would have either to admit that in the long run trust does not matter in 
financial markets, or to conclude that it is not generated by fixed or slowly 
changing social capital. It would have to come from some other source, at 
least in financial markets. 
Historical evidence is critical here. Without it, we cannot te11 how 
durable the effects of hust are, a matter that is essential for policy. Simply 
knowing that trust and lending are linked at one moment in time is not 
enough. If, for instance, the relationship between trust and lending does 
not va1y across the cenhtries, then trust is unfortunately not a variable that 
can be changed to promote better social outcomes. At the other extrerne, 
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if hust is simply the way individuals respond to the rehuns on a certain 
form of human capital, then it is an effect, not a cause, and the connection 
will run from anemic loan demand through trust to a low level of lending, 
making policies about trust as such unnecessary. Finally, if trust and its 
effects are persistent, but the effects decay over time, then it will be an 
important policy variable. 
Analyzing how h·ust, credit, and time interact requires a panel of obser-
vations with historical data. It also requires eliminating as many other 
sorts of variations in transactions costs as possible. The best way to do that 
would be to examine different markets within a single country. TI1e legal 
costs of discouraging untrustworthy behavior will be virtually the same 
throughout the country, and hence trust, and the social capital that gen-
el'ates it, will have more of a role in explaining variations in the level of 
lending or investment between different markets. If trust and social cap-
ital change slowly, theil' effect on lending or investment should remain 
the same over long periods. And the relationship between hust and social 
capital should hold in the past too. 
Testing whether social capital generates trust in past financial markets 
and whether the effects of trust persist across time is therefore essential, 
and we perform such a test in this paper. We focus on lendeJ.'s' h·ust in 
borrowers. Although it is not the only form of trust, it is essential for 
nearly all financial transactions, which typically involve a lender 01· other 
investor advancing money in return for a promised payment in the 
future, and all of our tests will concern this fo1m of trust. The evidence for 
the tests comes from 108 credit markets in one country-France-over 
nearly two centuries. The markets we look at are precisely the kind that 
are stepping stones to economic development in poorer countries, and, 
because they all lie within the same country, we can hold constant the 
judicial and political institutions that affect lending and in particular the 
legal costs of preventing or punishing fraudulent behavior. The next two 
sections develop th_e model of lending that underlies our statistical tests 
and present our data. We then carry out the tests and discuss their impli-
cations. We find that social capital has no significant effect on trust in the 
past, or at least the trust in borrowers that we consider here: it does not 
explain levels of lending that carmot be accounted for by economic vaii-
ables. Furthermore, although there are persistent differences in the level 
of lending that can conceivably be interpreted as trust, they have no rela-
tionship to social capital, and may well derive from other causes (such as 
informal institutions or the acquired expertise of financial intermediades) 
and have nothing to do with trust at all. The implication, which we take 
up i11 our conclusion, is that tiust in financial markets n1ay be generated 
by something other than social capital; alternatively, it and social capital 
may matter only in certain settings. In pai·ticular, h·ust becomes impor-
tant in societies where formal support for credit is low because of civil 
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conflict, widespread corruption, or ethnic discrimination. The evidence 
from France suggests that one might be better off treating the root of the 
problen1 rather than seeking to improve hust. 
A Simple Model of Trust 
How then should we conceive of bust in financial markets? Perhaps the 
easiest way to think of it is in the context of an extremely simple economic 
n1odel, one that helps pin down what it means when we say that trust 
should encourage n1ore lending and investment. Like all models, this one 
does gloss over a number of complexities; in particular, it lumps together 
the many ways in which h·ust can be established, as Bruce Carruthers 
shows in the previous chapter. It does capture the essence of b·ust in finan-
cial markets, however, and makes simple tests of om· hypotheses possible. 
The model requires a feT,V simple equatimlS, and readers who prefer can 
silnply jump to the end of the section because the underlying idea is quite 
simple. It is in fact merely the claim that, other things being equal, more 
trust ought to translate into n1ore lending. Precisely how much money is 
lent will of course depend on many l:h:ings, including interest rates, bor-
rowers' demand, and collateral But if these other factors are held constant, 
then inore hust ought to mean that lenders are willing to advance more 
money to borrowers. Such willingness is a prerequisite for most financial 
transactions, and it is essentially what is measmed in experiments on trust. 
Using oul' model we can see whether this trust changes over time and 
whether it is related to social capital. 
Imagine, then, a society in T,Vhich individuals can either borrow or lend; 
such a society is not too far removed from reality when financial markets 
are nnderdeveloped, as in the past or in developing countries today, par-
ticularly when lending moves beyond the narrow confines of a family or 
village. Each individual in this society has some wealth w. The amount 
may be small or large, He can either lend this money and earn interest 
ion the loan, or use it as collateral to borrow and set up a small business. 
If he sets up the small business, he will earn a rate of return r, which will 
depend on local demand and his talents as an entrepreneur. This rate of 
rehnn r will be the same no matter how much he borrows; if he takes out 
a loan of size x, he will therefore end up with (1 + r) x. We assume a large 
ntunber of individuals, so that any one of them will take the interest rate 
i as given (see the appendix for a formal version of what follows). 
Having earned this sum from his business, the entrepreneur will have 
to decide whether to default on his loan or repay it. To keep things sim-
ple, let us assume that he has only these two possibilities-default or 
repayment-and that if he defaults, he will face a penalty Tw that will be 
proportionate to his T,Vealth w. If Tis larger than l, then a default will cost 
him far more than the assets he owns. Such a penalty, which goes beyond 
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his wealth alone, could be interpreted as evidence of trust, as would be the 
case if borrowers who defaulted not only lost all their assets but faced social 
sanctions for violating social norms. Similarly, a T sn1aller than 1 might be 
interpreted as a lack of trust, although it could reflect other causes as well. 
A legal system that allowed a defaulting borrower to retain a large fraction 
of his assets would lead to a small T for reasons having nothing at all to do 
with hust. 
When it comes time for the borrower to repay, he thus faces a choice 
behveen giving his lender (1 + 1) x or defaulting and forfeiting the penalty 
T<V. The borrowerwjll default if (1 + i) x > Tw; knowing this, lenders will 
limit their loans to an amount X = T1v/(1 + i). Individuals who can set up 
businesses that will earn a rate of return r> i will borrow up to their credit 
limit of Tw/(1 + i); individuals with lower rates of retuin vvill 1end their 
wealth out at the interest rate i. If the dish·ibution of rates of return r 
among h1dividuals in the market is given by the distribution G(r) and the 
distribution of wealth among the same individuals is given by F(1v), then 
the fraction of individuals who lend money out when the market interest 
rate is i will be G(i), and the average amount lent per person will be 
G(i)E(wlr ~ i), (1) 
lVhere E(w/ r :$ i) is the average wealth of individuals with rates of rehun 
less than i. Sinlilarly, the average amount borrowed per capita will be 
{1-G(i))TE(w/r > i)/{1 + i), (2) 
T,Vhere Efrvl r > i) is the average wealth of individuals with rates of retu1n 
higher than i. To avoid complications, we assume that F and Gare independ-
ent; in other words, an individual's skill as an enh·epreneur has nothing 
to do with his wealth. For our simple model, this is not an mu·easonable 
assumption, provided we think of the return r as im1ate talent as an entre-
preneur.3 Because F and Gare independent, the average amount lent per 
person will be 
G(i)E(1v), (1') 
and the average bo1Towing per person will be 
(1 - G(i)) TE(w )/(1 + i), (2') 
where E(w) is simply average per capita wealth. Average borrowing per 
person T,Vill therefore be a function of the interest rate, average wealth, the 
distribution G of rates of return (which will reflect both the supply of 
entrepreneurial skills and the demand for enb:epreneurs' services), and 
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last but not least T (which is our trust measure but could reflect other fac-
tors as well, such as the legal system). A higher T implies-other things 
being equal-n1ore credit per capita: the same fraction 1- G(i) of people 
take out loans, but loan sizes increase, In practice, Twill end up being 
something of a residual, because we will 1neasure it using a regression to 
filter out the amount of per capita lending that cannot be accotmted for 
by the economic variables or by legal institutions, which will be held con-
stant if we remain in one cotmtry. But Tis nonetheless what trust in finan-
cial markets ought to be-lending that goes beyond what collateral alone 
would justify. 
So far we have dealt only with a single market and made the interest 
rate i exogenous. What happens when there are several such markets, 
each of different size and each with its own measure of trust and its own 
distribution of wealth and entrepreneurial talent? These distributions of 
wealth and talent may differ from market to market, but once again we 
assume that in each n1arket they are independent. If we suppose that 
funds can be transferred between markets, there will be an equilibdum 
interest rate i* that will equate the supply of funds to lend and the demand 
for loans and that will be conunon to all markets. Funds will flow from 
markets with low h·ust to markets with high h·ust, and if we measure 
average borrowing per person in each market, in market j it will be 
Y1 = (1-G1(i'))T;E1(w)/(1+ i'), (3) 
where G; is the distribution of talent in the market, Ej(w) is the average 
value of wealth in the market (calculated using the market's distiibution 
of wealth F;), and Ti is the market's trust measure. Note that the logaritlun 
of yiwill be 
ln(y1) = ln(l - G1 (i')) + ln(J;) + lnE1 (w) - ln(l + i') (4) 
The first term, 1n(1- G1 (i*)), will depend on the interest rate, the sup-
ply of talent, and local demand conditions, and in a regression we would 
expect it to be a linear function (at least to a first order approximation) of 
the 1ogaritl1ms of variables such as the interest rate, measures of local tal-
ent (such as literacy rates), and local indexes of demand (such as urban 
populations and the number of banks). Similarly, Jn(T;) will at least 
approximately be a linear function of the logarithms of measures of social 
capital embodied in norms or social networks, if trust is in fact related to 
social capital. Even if T;is also affected by the legal system, the portion of 
T; that is a function of legal or political variables will presumably be con-
stant and hence swept into the constant term if we confine ourselves to 
data from one country, because legal and political institutions will then 
be the same for all markets. 
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Tl1e model is most easily interpreted as explaining what 1-ve would 
observe at one point in tin1e in a cross-sectional regression. In such a 
regression, the equilibrium interest rate will also be a constant, and the 
coefficients of U1e social capital measures will reveal whether trust T1 is 
related to social capital But the model can easily be extended to observa-
tions of the same markets at different times, with the trust Ti in each mar-
ket either being fixed or vruying over time. We can test whether T1 is fixed 
using panel data, which can also tell us whether the relationship between 
trust and social capital persists across time. Both sorts of regressions can 
easily be run using the historical data we have collected. 
Data for 108 French Credit Markets: 
1740to1899 
The data we have gathered concern more than200,000 loans drawn from 
108 credit markets scattered through France (see figure 9.1 for a map 
and table 9.1 for sununary data on their populations). The markets were 
chosen to yield a stratified sample of towns and cities that would reflect 
the French population as a whole. The mai·kets included Paris, other 
large cities such as Lyon; medium-sized urban centers with 10,000 to 
70,000 inhabitants such as Grenoble, and smaller towns with popula-
tions as low as 500. The loans in each market were di_·awn up by notaries 
(semiprivate court officers who preserved records and provided legal 
and financial advice) and subject to a tax. The notaries had to register 
the loans at the local tax office, where officials collected the tax and 
recorded information about the debts. We gathered information from the 
offices' archives, which covered lending in the municipality where the 
office \.Vas located and in surrounding towns and villages. Although there 
were certainly some small debts that did not appear in these archives, 
most lenders had a powerful incentive to report their loans to the offices 
and do so tiuthfully, for otherwise they would have had difficulty pur-
sttlng defaulting debtors in court. Unregistered debt was therefore likely 
to be minimal, though the exact amounts at stake cannot be measured 
precisely.4 
For this chapter, we leave aside information about the identities of the 
parties involved in the loan contracts and focus on the number of new 
loans, average loan sizes, and loan durations; we then use this informa-
tion to estimate the stock of outstanding debt in each market for six years: 
1740, 1780, 1807, 1840, 1865, and 1899 (for details about the data collection 
and the estimation proces.5, see the appendix). The dates of these esti-
mates were chosen to be roughly a generation apart, with two dates-
1780 and 1807-bracketing a devastating bout of hyperinflation during the 
French Revolution. The first date, 1740, was the earliest for which we could 
collect data on lending and explanatory variables for all of our markets; 
256 Whom Can We Trust? 
Figure 9.1 Credit Markets in Sample 
• Paris (Debt Stock 450 :Million Francs) 
.._ Markets With Debt Stock Greater than 10 Million Francs 
+ Markets With Debt Stock Greater than 1 Million Francs 
• .lviarkets With Debt Stock Less than 1 :Million Francs 
- North South Boundaiy 
• ... 
•• 
•• 
"' •
• 
., 
• 
••• 
• 
Source: Authors' compilation based on sources described in the appendix. 
the last date, 1899, was the 1nost recent for which we could get access to 
the records needed for the data collection. 
One might naturally wony whether the French Revolution altered 
legal and political institutions so greatly that our data might be affected 
after 1807. Institutions did certainly change, but not enough to distort our 
data. The court system was reorganized, which perhaps reduced the costs 
of litigation, but the law governing credit contracts remained much the 
same. Thesan1e was by and large hue for notaries, and it held as well for 
the officials who collected the tax on Joans and registered them. h1deed, 
Table 9.1 
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1. Loan Characteristics (Values in 1840) 
All Without 
Characteristic Markets Paris 
Average loan size 3,860 1,847 
(francs) 
Median loan size 
-
500 
(francs) 
Average loan duration 4.62 4.68 
(years) 
2. Vadables and Measures of Trust and Social Capital 
Variable Name 
Dependent variables 
(values in selected 
periods) 
Per capita stock 
of loans in 1740 
Per capita stock 
of loans in 1780 
Per capita stock 
of loans in 1807 
Per capita stock 
of loans in 1899 
Social capital measures 
Oath scale 
Intermediate score 
Tumout1849 
Resist draft: 
self-mutilate 
Description/Units Mean SD 
livres 54.00 11022 
livres 70.03 159.90 
francs 53.09 82.76 
francs 270.69 294.68 
Index of fraction of priests 329 1.52 
taking oath of loyalty to the 
revolutionary constitution in 
1791, with higher score on 
1-to-6 scale meaning more 
priests took the oath 
Dummy variable equalingl if 0.59 0.49 
score on 1-to-6 oath scale was 
2, 3, or 4; variable equals 
O otherwise. 
Vote turnout in 1849 70.59 8.32 
(percentage eligible voters) 
Local draftees (per 1,000 recruits) 1.10 0.88 
exempted 1820-1830 for loss 
of a finger, presumably due 
to self-mutilation. Because it 
could be zero, \Vl1at was 
entered in the regressions 
was the logarithm of this 
variable plus 0.01. (Table co11ti1111es 011 p. 258.) 
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Table 9.1 Descriptive Statistics (co11ti1111cd) 
2. Variables and Measures of Trust and Social Capital 
Variable Name Description/Units lviean SD 
Resist draft: fail to Local draftees (per 1,000 recruits) 6.13 1259 
report ivho failed to report in 
1820-1830. Because it could 
be zero, what entered the 
regressions was the logarithm 
of this vaiiable plus 0.01. 
Verdicts (value in Verdicts against defendants in 0.85 0.61 
1840) civil and criminal h'ials 
(per 100 inhabitants) 
Verdicts (value in Verdicts against defendants in 0.67 0.23 
1865) civil and criminal trials 
(per 100 inhabitants) 
Verdicts (value in Verdicts against defendants in 0.83 0.83 
1899) civil and criminal trials 
(per 100 inhabitants) 
Trust measures 
Annuity share 1740 Share of pe1petual annuities in 0.72 0.27 
total stock 1740 
Annuity share 1780 Share of perpetual annuities in a.so 0.31 
total stock 1780 
Other variables (value 
in selected periods) 
City population Population of city where regis- 19,853 85,734 
(in 1840) tration office located 
Banks (number in Ntunber of banks; because it 4.46 21.06 
1840) could be zero, what \Vas 
entered in the regressions 
was the logarithm of this 
variable plus 1. 
Wealth (value in Property tax per 1,000 people 4.69 1.35 
1840) (francs) 
Voters Number of men eligible to vote 213.00 1,113.22 
in 1840 
illiteracy Percentage of draftees who are 49.82 19.62 
illiterate, 1820 to 1830 
Source: Authors' compilation based on sources described in the appendix. 
Notes: For detailed description of the variables, see text and appendix. Table shows per 
capita stock of loans for 1740, 1780, 1807, and 1899. Values for other variables are shown for 
the first and last dates they are available only. Monetary amounts ln 1740 and 1780 wer.e in 
livres, whkh equaled 0.989 francs, the curl ency unit created during the French Revolution. 
To get a sense of the value of the value of the amounts involved, in 1740 an tmskilled day 
laborer oorned I livre a day in Paris; in 1840,his wages had climbed to roughly2.4 francs a 
day; and by1899, they were nearlyS francs a day. We did not compute median loan siZi;5 
for all markets including Paris because of the different sampling strategy used with the rans 
records. The average loan duration is calculiited weighting durations by Joan sizes. 
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the nature of the tax and the size of the areas covered by each office hardly 
changed (for the relevant legal, political, and administrative reforms 
under the revolution and Napoleon, see Woloch 1994). In any case, we 
can check whether the revolutionary turmoil made a difference by run-
ning our regressions for the period between 1840and1899, Vl'hen the legal 
and political institutions were all in place and uniform across the entire 
cottnlry. It tun1s out that results do not depend on whether we use the 
data from 1840 to 1899 or the entire sample. 
The loans in our 108 markets were mortgages and business loans with 
durations running from a few months to several years or more (for sum-
mary data on the loans and on the variables used in our analysis, see 
table 9.1). Jn 1740, 30 percent of then1 took the form of life or perpetual 
annuities, which lenders invested in for support in old age or to create a 
stream of income that profligate heirs could not dissipate. TI1e rest were 
term loans with an average duration of slightly over two years. The annu-
ities disappeared in the nineteenth centmy, but loan durations grew to 
almost nine years by 1899. The sums involved were in total very large. If 
we extrapolate.from our sample to France as a whole, the outstanding stock 
of this debt was perhaps 21 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
1740 and 23 percent of GDP a century later. By 1899,it reached 44 percent 
of GDP. Even so, n1any of the loans involved only modest sums. Outside 
Paris, for example, the median loan size was 500 francs (F) in 1840, roughly 
a year's earnings for a day laborer. TI1e records are full of smaller loans: 
F 100 that the vintner Fnmc;ois Meunier and his wife borrowed in 1840 
from their neighbor, the laborer Franc;ois Gressin, or F 160 that the laborer 
Etienne Desgens owed the landowner Franc;ois Poubeau the same year.5 
Unfortunately, the tax records we used to gather our data often omit-
ted the interest rate charged on the loans. 6 Eighteenth-century term loans 
were particularly likely to leave out the interest rate, though it was usu-
ally 5 percent when it was indicated. Mention of the rates was more com-
mon in the nineteenth century, with 5 percent being the modal figure. The 
gap in rates between different markets was greatest in the 1899 cross sec~ 
ti on, when 90 percent of the records give an interest charged on the loan. 
At first glance, the figures from 1899 might seem to cast doubt on our 
assun1ption that our loan markets were integrated, because the average 
interest rates in distinct markets differed by as much 1 percent. Yet in 
80 percent of the mai·kets the averages fell in a narrow range between 4.22 
and 4.73 percent, which suggests that theassumptionisnot urueasonable, 
particularly given that the gap in rates between markets was smaller in 
our other cross sections. Furthermore, lenders participated in multiple 
markets, yet another sign of integration. Even in Lunel, the market with 
highest average interest rate in 1899--4.97 percent-there were in fact 
lenders who came from the cities of Montpellier and Mmes. Such piece-
wise integration was in fact the norm in our credit markets.7 
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What about the collateral backing the loans, which is also an important 
part of our model? The original contracts preserved in the notarial 
archives describe the collateral in great detail, because providing such 
inforntation was essential part of the notaries' service. But our fiscal 
records often gloss as well over that information, which was not needed 
for collecting the tax, and going back to the original contracts to gather it 
would have slol-ved om· data collection to a crawl. 
We have, however, been able to exainine the odginal conh·acts in several 
specific markets. In them, loans with a duration of a year or more almost 
always involved real estate as collateral. In 1740, for exan1ple, annuities 
were nearly always collateralized on specific pieces of land or other real 
property, but shorter term loans (with a typical duration of three to twelve 
months) mention no specific collateral. By 1780, specific real collateral did 
begin to appear in these term loans, which came to resemble modem day 
mortgages \Vi th balloon payn1ents, and in the nineteenth century more than 
three-quarters of all contracts involved mortgaged real estate of some sort. 
AB for the remaining loans without any mention of specific collateral, they 
did usually give a general clain1 to the borrower's assets in case of default, 
but Joans backed by liens on specific collateral were paid off first, leaving 
lenders with general claims to share what was left. 
The per capita stock of outstanding loans in each market is our mea-
sure of y1, borrowing per person in our model.It was calculated by divid-
ing our estimates of the loan stock by the population in the surronnding 
canton, a small region that included the IDlUlicipality where the loans 
were registered plus nearby towns and villages.s The calculation thus 
yields a panel of data, with a Yi for each market j and for eacl1 of our six 
cross sections from 1740 to 1899. 
Trust and Social Capital 
Our model implies that the Yi can be regressed on social capital measures 
and economic variables to see whether a persistent effect can be inter-
preted as trust and, if so, whether it is related to social capital. The regres-
sions can either be panel regressions or cross-sectional regressions for one 
of the six individual years. A panel regression addresses the question of 
hust's persistence and can also be used to explore the relationship between 
h·ust and social capital. But a series of cross-sectional regressions at differ-
ent times can do the same; if one finds an effect that seems like trust in one 
cross section but not others, then it is difficult to maintain that trust is per-
sistent. Normally, the panel regression is preferable to the cross sections, 
but the lack of data for certain periods makes it lvorth examining the cross 
sections too. 
To make it clear how the regressions will be specified and \Vhat hy-
potheses will be tested, let us return to our model. Whether we are using 
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panels or cross sections, our regressions will always be based on equation 
(4), For the cross sections, the regressions to estimate will have the form 
Jn(y1) =a+ b XJ + c ZJ + 11; (5) 
Here j is the index for eacl1 of the 108 1narkets; llj is the error term; a, b, 
and care 1natrices of regression coefficients; xi is a matrix of logarithms of 
01eastffes of wealth and local demand conditions, which come fro1n a first 
order expansion in logaritluns of the terms ln(l - Gi (i*)) and lnEi(w) in 
(4); and Zj is a matrix of logarithms of social capital measures or other vari-
ables correlated with trust, which are derived similarly from the term 
!n(T1) in (4). 
TI1e panel regression will be similar except that the interest rate i*will 
enter the regressions too, as a variable that vruies over time but not from 
market to market.9 The panel regression will also include fixed (or ran-
dom) effects w1 that measure persistent characteristics of market j; because 
a persistently larger ln(T;) in market j might yield a larger w1 in a first-
order expansion, these fixed or random effects could be interpreted as 
long-lasting trust. All the other variables in the panel regression can 
depend on both the market j and the date of the cross section t; fo1mally, 
the panel regression will be 
ln(yfl) =a+ bxi, +CZµ+ dvt +WI+ IIµ (6) 
Here v1 is a matrix of dummy variables for each time period (except 
one) that captures changes in the interest rate, and Xji and Zjt are analogous 
to the corresponding matrices of variables in (5). 
Regression equations (5) and (6) will be used to test two hypotheses: 
first, that h·ust was related to social capital in the past, and second, that 
trust is persistent across time. If the first hypothesis is true, then the coef-
ficients of the social capital vruiables in zi should have large and significant 
coefficients with appropriate signs when the cross-sectioTu'ti regressions 
(5) are rnn with Otff historical data. If the second hypothesis is true, then 
either the W; in U1e panel regressions should be large or the correlates of 
trust in Zit should have large and significant coefficients with the appropri-
ate signs.10 If both hypotheses hold, then the social capital variables in Zif 
should have large and significant coefficients with U1e expected sign in the 
panel regressions. 
To see what these expected signs are, let us introduce all of our vrui-
ables. The per capita value of the property tax se1ves as our wealth mea-
sure; it is available only for the 1840, 1865, and 1899 cross sections (for a 
description of the sources for these and the 0U1er explanatory variables, 
see the appendix; for summary data, see table 9.1). If a wealU1measure is 
included in the panel regressions, they can therefore only be rnnfor these 
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tlu·ee periods. 11 The local demand rneastu-es include the population of fue 
municipality where the loans were registered, and the number of banks, 
which was not available for 1740 and 1780. Presumably migration would 
have swelled the population of the cities where demand was sfrong;note 
that these municipal populations are different from the canton popula-
tion that was used to figure pe1· capita wealth and the per capita loan 
stock. Banks would have opened in such cities as well, 1naking their ntun-
ber yet another index of demand. The banks specialized in providing 
short-term mercantile credit, and because banking was essentially unreg-
ulated, they tended to open in mru·kets where merchants were thriving, 
making their presence a good index of demand.12 By the 1830s, hundreds 
of firms or individuals (many of whom were wholesale merchants who 
offered trade credit on the side) were providing such comtnerdal bank-
ing services. About one-third were in Paris and the rest primarily in the 
largest cities. As the century wore on, the banks spread rapidly through 
France's smaller cities. In 1829, two of every tlU"ee cities with populations 
greater than 20,000 had a bank office; by 1851, all of them did. For cities 
betweenS,000and10,000, the fraction with banks juni.ped from one-third 
in 1829 to 87percentin1862. 
Of these three variables, wealth is exogenous (at least in our simple 
model), and because the number of banks and the city populations are 
likely to be endogenous, we have used their lagged values in all of our 
regressions. We also have one measure of entrepreneurial talent-
namely, literacy rates, which were measured from 1820 to 1830. Like the 
demand measures, literacy will affect the expxession ln(l - G1 (i*)). 
We have several social capital n1easures, each one indexing a particu-
lar form of social capital. It proved impossible to find other useablemeas-
ures of social capital.13 Only one of the social capital indices varies over 
time; the others caphtre social capital at one specific date. Two of the 
measures concern Catholicism, which was, at least nominally, the religion 
of most French people. The first religious indicator measures the extent 
to which local Catholic priests took an oath of allegiance to the French rev-
olutionary constitution. The oath was required of all clergymen in 1791, 
but substantial numbers refused, and this opposition varied considerably 
from place to place (Tackett 1986). The higher the numerical score in scale, 
the greater the proportion of priests who took the oath, and the regions 
where most did so tended to be those where ties to orthodox Catholicism 
were weak and remained weak throughout the nineteenth centu1y. By 
contrast, the regions where the clergy refused the oath were so strongly 
attached to Catholicism that all sorts of behavior was affected for decades--
in particular, the use of birth control. The reasons for the differences were 
historical. Inmanyru·eas where the clergy took the oath, not only had reli~ 
gious devotion faded away by the outbreak: of the revolution, but shortly 
thereafter the clergy was removed during the revolutionary campaign 
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against Catholicism. Parishes then went without piiests for years. When 
the priests finally returned, often not until well into the Napoleonic 
empire or even later, after restoration of the monarchy h1 1814, the by then 
anticlerical citizens were hardly inclined to listen to a p1iest's advice. 
Meanwhile, in the regions where the clergy spu1ned the oath, most priests 
had gone into hiding and ministered to the faithful in private. In these 
hotbeds of co1mterrevolution, the priests were hailed as heroes when 
orthodox Catholicism was restored, and parishioners faithfully heeded 
admonitions from the pulpit.14 
Religious no1ms would thus exert more influence over behavior in tl1e 
places where the clergy rejected the oath and where Catholicism remained 
robust-in other words, in areas where the oath score was low. What 
would the norms say aboutrepayingdebts? Worries about usu1y had long 
sh1ce withered away h1 Catholicism, at least at the level of daily life, and 
failure to pay a legitimate debt would presumably be tantamount to theft, 
provided of course that the borrower was not facing a dire emergency 
(Hoffman,Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2000; Dumas 1953; Noonan 1957). 
If so, religious norms would pressure borrowers to uphold their end of 
the bargain, and logarithm of the oath scale would enter both panel and 
cross sectional regressions with a large, negative coefficient (for a list of 
the social capital measures <lnd their expected sign in cross sectional and 
panel regressions, see table 9 .2). 
There is, however, a second and different way that the oath measure 
could conceivably enter the regressions. Where priests refused the oath, 
religious norms should have been effective, but the conh·asting anticleri-
cal regions should have had a strong attaclunent to the secular norms of 
the revolution and, later, the French Republic, which would entail respect 
for state courts and legal contracts. In areas with intermediate scores, 
hoivever, it would not be dear whether either norm applied, and lenders 
would presumably have to exercise more caution. Such areas were likely 
to be divided beh"leen two mutually suspicious and even hostile camps: 
on one side, the royalist Catholics and, on the other, the anticlerical repub-
licans.15 Unforhmately, we cannot actually trace out the membership of 
camps because borrowers and lenders did not identify themselves as roy-
alists, Catholics, republicans, or anticledcals. But we know that they did 
exist from realistic nineteenth-century novels. In BaJzac'sll111sio11s perdues 
(1843/1990), for instance, the clergy and royalist officials in Angoul@me 
simply cease doing business with the printer David Sechard when rival 
printers falsely accuse him of atheism and republicanism; he nonetheless 
continues to work for the city's merchants, lawyers, and notaries, whose 
liberal opinions place them in the opposite camp. Should one h·ust such 
evidence? Dismissing it simply because it comes from a novel seems fool-
ish. Balzac after all was describing a city and a business he knew well and 
was in fact striving for accw·ate detail .16 
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Me1nbers of these two camps \.VOuld be leery of dealing with one 
another, particularly when something like lending was involved, for social 
nehvorks would likely not cross the divide. I-low could, say, a republican 
lender pull strings in a royalist's social network to get a loan repaid? As a 
result, fewer loans would be made in places with such intermediate scores, 
because lenders would often have to rely on the legal system alone, not on 
social networks. If so, a dummy variable for places with such intennedi-
ate scores would have a negative sign in both the panel and cross-sectional 
regressions. 
A third measure of social capital-voter turnout-is identical to one 
used in Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales's study of trust 
in financial markets (2004). For them, high voter turnout is a sign that 
behavior is guided by norms or by networks that ptmish aberrant behav-
ior. One argument in favor of such a claim is that narrow economic self-
interest alone cannot justify tu1ning out to vote, because the time spent 
voting cam1ot be justified by the infinitesimal odds that one's ballot will 
sway the outcome. This is a classic example of a free rider problem, and 
high voter tu1nout suggests that it has been overcome. Norms or other 
punishment of misbehavior would be one way to achieve such a solution. 
We have turnout for one election only, Many other elections were held, 
but to guarantee that the voting statistics would be comparable, we have 
resfricted ourselves to instances where the voting met four conditions: the 
elections had to aU be of the same type, the electoral districts had to be 
nearly identical to our markets, the suffrage had to be the same and as 
broad as possible, and voters must not have faced pressure to spurn the 
election and stay home. Concretely, these conditions limited us to general 
elections (and not local ones) with universal male suffrage. We further 
excluded cases in which the turnout was exh·emely low in some dishicts, 
which we took to be a mark of pressure on voters. We were left with the 
elections of May 1849, in which voters cast ballots for representatives in 
the Second Republic's new Assembly; in the future, however, we may 
include other elections as well.17 If the arguments about norms are correct, 
a high turnout in the 1849 elections should boost T and thus have a large 
positive coefficient in both the panel and cross-sectional regressions. 
Draft resistance provides a fourth measure of social capital. Conscription 
works when draftees trust their government or are at least committed to 
following its orders (Levi 1998). Conceivably, trust in the government or 
commibnent to its rules might translate into respect for legal agreements, 
such as loan contracts. If so, indexes of draft resistance should enter into 
the regressions \.Vith a large negative coefficient.18 
We have two such measures. The first is the proportion of the draftees 
who failed to report between 1820 and 1830. Although failure to report 
when called might appear an unambiguous sign of draft resistance, it 
could also reflect something quite different. The draftee could be dead, in 
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prison, or away working as a migrant laborer, as often happened in 
regions where large numbers of yotmg men left to \.Vork part of the year 
as itinerant inasons. As a result, this n1easure captures other phenomena 
besides draft resistance, and it was in fact highest in areas with large pop-
ulations of migratory laborers. 
The second measure is much more clear cut. It is the percentage of the 
draftees between 1820 and 1830 who escaped service because they had 
mutilated themselves---typically by cutting off a finger. Apart from the 
occasional accident, the meaning of self-mutilation is unambiguous. And 
where such self-mutilation was common, T should have been low. The 
same should presumably be tl'ue for the other measure of draft l'esistancc. 
Both variables should therefore have large negative coefficients in the 
panel and cross section regressions. 
Our final measure of social capital is a legal one-the per capita num-
ber of verdicts against defendants in civil and criminal trials, which we can 
measure in 1840, 1865, and 1899; it is our one measure of social capital that 
varies over time. We cotmt the guilty verdicts in criminal h'ials, add to that 
the number of civil judgments against defendants, and divide the total by 
the population. If the measure is high, then either there is a great deal of 
crime relative to the population or n1any legal transactions end up in court. 
Either way, hust would presumablybelow,leaving a variable that should 
have a large negative sign in the regressions, 
Those are our measures of social capital; their expected signs in the 
regressions (if trust is related to social capital) are sho\.vn in table 9.2. In 
addition, we have two independent measures of trust in borrowers that do 
not necessarily have any connection to social capital. They will be useful for 
testing whether trust in borrowers persists in credit markets even if it is 
unrelated to social capital The first is the share of outstanding loans in 1740 
that were perpetual annuities; the second is the same measure, only in 1780. 
Again, the perpetual annuities involved a lender's giving money to a bor-
rower inretutn for an annual stream of payments, which (at least in theo1y) 
could continue forever given that it was the borrower alone (or his heirs) 
who decided when the pdncipal was to be repaid. As we have noted, loans 
of this sort were common in 1740and1780,andrequired thatalenderenter 
into an open-ended and long-te1m commib:nent to a borrower. Such a com-
mitment was arguably a sign of trust, because it would be hard for a lender 
to know what would happen to a borrower's collateral in the years after the 
loan was first made. The share of such annuities in the total of outstanding 
loans, either in 1740orin1780, thus provides yet another measure of trust, 
but one that is not necessarily tied to social capital. 
As a measure, it is a particularly interesting one because it allows a pos-
sible test of the persistence of hust. Consider the share of perpetual annu-
ities in 1740, If it entered the regressions with a positive sign in periods 
after 1740, this could conceivahly be taken as evidence that the same trust 
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n1a1 auowect lenders to make a long-term commitment in 1740 was still 
working years later. ff, however, the regression coefficient sign is zero or 
negative, then trust in 1740 apparently exercises no hold in later periods. 
In that case, trust, if it did play a role in financial markets, would simply 
not have any lasting effects; in other words, trust itself would va1y. 
Sintllar arguments could be made about the share of perpetual annuities 
in 1780 if it is used as a variable in later periods. 
For historical reasons, we might actually expect that this sort of h·ust 
shown in 1740or1780 might \Vellfade away, particularly for the share of 
perpetual armuities in 1780. Lenders who entered into perpetual contracts 
in that year ended up losing heavily during the hyperinflation of the 
French Revolution (Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2000). Their 
loans were aU repaid in worthless paper money, and their long-tei·m com-
mihnent, which could be taken as a sign of trust, was sorely abused. It 
would not be surprising if they and their descendants refused to make 
such conunitments in the future; their reluctance would then register in 
the regressions as a lack of trust. But, as we shall see, this not the only pos-
sible test for the persistence of h·ust. 
Results 
Let us then examine the evidence fron1 the regressions. Again, we have 
two hypotheses to test: first, that trust was linked to social capital in the 
past, and, second, that it persists across time. The first hypothesis requires 
nonfinancial measures of social capital to get around the problem that low 
levels of social capital in financial markets may reflect only low demand 
for loans. The second hypothesis requires panel data. We begin by assum-
ing that the two hypotheses are both true, using panel regressions. We 
next move to repeated cross-sectional regressions to test the first hypoth-
esis alone and explore the relationship between trust and social capital. 
We then return to panel regressions to test the second hypothesis by itself 
and see whether trust is persistent. 
Let us first test whether both hypotheses are true. The test amounts to 
seeing whether the social capital variables in Zjt have large and significant 
coefficients with the signs shown in table 9.2. The dependent variable in 
the panel regressions is the logaritlun of the per capita stock of outstanding 
debt; the other explanatory variables are logarithms of wealth (because 
our wealth measures are not available before 1840, it is omitted in regres-
sions with cross sections before that yeru") and of measures of demand, 
including the nwnber of banks and the population of the municipality 
where the loans are registered. Because at this stage we have no wealth 
measures for the first tlu·ee periods and no count of banks for the first two, 
the regressions ru·e run with all the variables for the period from 1840 to 
1899, and without banks and wealth for 1740 to 1899 (tables 9.3 and 9.4, 
--- -•• ~•~ ~-..v~•'-'Y"'._. .. '-'• • •'-"'-" i.u.ui.tLL.1<11 1Vl<11'KCIB 
Table 9.2 Hypotheses and Expected Signs of Regression Coefficients 
If Trust Is Related to Social Capital 
Measure of Social Capital 
Intermediate score 
Oath scale 
Turnout in 1849 
Resist draft: self-mutilate 
Resist draft: fail to report 
Verdicts 
Measure of Trust 
Annuity share 1740 
Annuity share 1780 
Expected Sign of Coefficient 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Jf Tiust Is Persistent 
Expected Sign of Coefficient 
Positive 
Positive 
Source: Authors' model and argument made in text. 
""' 
regressions 1 through 7). The panel regressions are estimated using ran-
dom effects when our social capital measures do not vary over time.19 
Some of these time-invariant social capital measures come from the rev-
olutionruy period and son1e from the middle of the nineteenth century, 
but each one is measured only once. All the coefficients have a simple 
intetpretation: they measure by what percentage the dependent variable 
would change if the independent variable increased by 1 percent (in eco-
nomic terms, they are elasticities). 
The panel regressions show that om· measure of lending per capita is 
clearly related to local conditions. Larger cities have large average out~ 
standing debt, as do areas with more banks and markets where taxes per 
capita are higher-precisely what our model of credit rationing \vould 
suggest. AB far as our two hypotheses are concerned, however, the regres~ 
sions argue against them both. Only one of the social capital coefficients 
turns out to be statistically significant and have the sign we \Vould expect 
if trust were persistent and linked to social capital (see tables 9.2 to 9.4). 
That one coefficient comes fron1Jailt1re to report, our somewhat ambigu-
ous measure of draft resistance, which could well reflect something besides 
social capital. If it did reflect social capital-if, for instance, a willingness 
to serve meant people had confidence in fonnal institutions-then we 
would expect a negative coefficient not only for failure to report, but for our 
other, less equivocal measure of draft resistance, self-mutilation. But it in 
fact has a positive coefficient. As for the other social capital measures, ver-
dicts has a coefficient with the wrong sign. Oath scale, the turnout in the 
1848 elections, and our measure of religious divisions (internrediate score) 
do all have the expected sign, but not one is close to being significant. 
Table 9.3 Test of Both HYPotheses: Selected Coefficients from Panel Regressions, 1840 to 1899 
Variable 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gty population 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.( 4.99 4.82 4.85 4.91 5.34 5.05 o.~ 
Bonks 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 
-OJ 1.71 1.73 1.77 1.82 1.84 1.57 -0.9 
Wealth 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.1 1.82 1.73 1.63 1.63 1.52 1.70 0.8 
Social capital intermediate oath scale tumout resist draft: resist draft: verdicts verd.i( measure score 1849 self-mutilate fail to report 
Social capital 
--0.13 
-0.11 0.36 0.06 
--0.06 0.14 oz coefficient 
-1.04 
-1.05 074 1.81 
-2.33 1.26 1.4( 
N 290 290 294 299 302 302 so; 
Specification random random random random random random fL'Ced of effects 
Fraction of variance 0.32 
due to effects 
031 033 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.66 
Source: Authors' compilation based on sources described in the appendix. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita stock of outstanding loans, and the explanatory variables are all logarithms, except for in.term 
ate score, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 in markets that had intermediate scores on the oath taking scale. See table 9.1 and the text for details. B, 
and city population are lagged. The regression also included dummy variables for the different cross sections to capture changes in the interest rate, 
other time varying effects. Coefficient estimates are on the top of each cell, T-statistics are below. 
Table 9.4 Test of Both Hypotheses: Selected Coefficients from Panel Regressions, 1740 to 1899 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
City population 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.54 
12.28 12.19 12.65 12.63 13.04 12.46 12.46 
Social capital intermediate oath scale turnout resist draft: resist draft: verdicts verdicts 
measure score 1849 self-mutilate fail to report in 1840 in 1865 
Social capital --0.02 --0.06 0.13 0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.05 
coefficient --0.15 -0.67 0.31 0.88 -1.75 1.20 0.35 
N 498 498 505 513 518 518 518 
Specification random random random random random random random 
of effects 
Fraction of 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 030 030 
variance due 
to effects 
Source· Authors' compilation based on sources descn'bed In the appendix. . . . f · 1· ion 7 did the 
Notes: Because the variable verdicts is not available before 1840, regression 6 was rtl!1 ~g its ".al:bf ~~40 :r!;.e~~~an~dr~~~ are omitted. 
same, using value in 1865. The other explanatory v~~les and the dependent vana e are as m e , C-r 
Coefficient estimates are on the top of each cell, T-statistics are below. 
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even if a larger sample yielded n1orc precise estimates the connection 
between trust and social capital would be econonllcally trivial. 20 And the 
conclusions are the same whether we look at full panel or only the data 
from 1840 on; they are therefore not the result of institutional change dur-
ing the French Revolution.21 
Let us set aside the second hypothesis te1nporadly and focus on the first 
one, which asserts that trust is tied to social capital. The regressions here are 
cross sectional and resen1ble those nm by other researchers in that they fake 
a reduced form approach to evaluating trust, using inshuments culled from 
nonfinancial measures of social capital Our nonfinancial measures are in 
fact quite close to those others have used. But there are two differences 
between their work and ours. The first is that we have no direct measure of 
trust, such as the surveys that some contemporary researchers employ. TI1at 
is perhaps a weakness, but it is offset by a second difference, which works 
in our favor. That second difference is that we follow financial development 
over a century and a half, something contemporary researchers cannot do. 
Table 9.5 gives the results for a sample of our cross-sectional regressions. 
Like the panel regressions, they provide little evidence in favor of a close 
link between hust and social capital, even though we can augment the set 
of control variables for several regressions. If we run the cross-sectional 
regressions for 1865, for instance, we can add a measure of entrepreneurial 
talent (illiteracy, as measured among milita1y recruits) and a measure of 
wealth inequality (the proportion of tax payers who had enough property 
to be eligible to vote in 1840).22 The economic variables are jointly signifi-
cant and generally have the predicted sign, except for banks once we con~ 
trol for wealth and inequality (through the number of males rich enough to 
vote in 1840 and illiteracy, which is correlated with poverty as well as entre-
prenew·ial talent). Overall the economic variables explain 46 percent of the 
variance in the logarithm of per capita lending. 
Yet even with these additional variables, the social capital measures 
still fail to have coefficients that are both statistically significant and have 
the expected sign for the 1865 cross section (table 9.5, regressions 2 
through 7). The results are similar if we run the regressions for t11e other 
cross sections. Although we do not report all the results here, the only one 
that comes close to demonstrating a relationship between trust and social 
capital is the 1840 regression with failure to report, our ambiguous mea-
sure of draft resistance (table 9.5, regression 8). It has the right sign, and 
the odds that it is a statistical fluke are less than .082. But again the mea-
sure itself is questionable, the coefficient is small, and in any case, this 
single result is a weak reed on which to stand an argument about the con-
nection between trust and social capital. In fact, it is remarkable that only 
one of several dozen coefficients (because we can run these regressions 
going all the way back to the revolution) is statistically significant. 
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It thus seems that if h·ust does play a role in credit markets over the 
long term, it has little to do with social capital. Trust and social capital 
may be connected in certain markets today, but the co1mection is not uni-
versal and did not always hold in the past, even though the set of social 
capital variables was large. One could, of course, raise doubts about such 
a conclusion, arguing that our data are n1easured with error and that our 
regression coefficients are therefore biased toward zero. One could also 
make a similar argument about omitted variables. But if so, why do we 
continue to find no convincing evidence in favor of social capital in 1865 
and in 1899, '¥hen the data are quite accLU·ate, the relevant political insti-
tutions have long been in place, and we can include additional variables 
as well? Furthermore, our data avoid some of the obvious drawbacks of 
the s1uveys that other researchers on trust use. Our evidence con1es from 
real transactions in which people had sizable sums of money at stake-a 
big difference from surveys. True, our measure of trust in borrowers is 
something of a residual, but the lack of any relationship between it and 
conventional measures of social capital suggests that social capital is sim-
ply not essential for generating financial trust. The results may of course 
be different for the sort of small consumer debts that never appear in om 
database, but that sort of credit was much less important than the lend-
ing in the n1arkets we studied. In them, social capital was not related to 
financial trust. 
If the evidence thus argues against the first hypothesis, what about the 
second one, that trust is persistent? There is at least some conceivable sup-
port for it. If we run the panel regressions without social capital measures, 
\'\'e can then use fixed effects to measure persistent differences betvvecn mar-
kets. The fixed effects tum out to be appreciable: they explain a significant 
fraction of the variance in the per capita stock of lending (between 63 and 
67 percent), and an F-test shows that the odds of all the fixed effects being 
zero is less than .0001 (table 9.6, regressions 1and3).23 The panel regressions 
thus imply that there are large and persistent differences between markets 
that our economic variables (wealth and the demand measures, banks and 
city size) carmot account for. The persistent differences may be interpreted 
as evidence that h-ustexists and endures over time, but it should be sh·essed 
they may also reflect other causes as well, such as geographic conditions that 
favor economic growth, info1mal instihrtions that have nothing to do \Vith 
b.ust, or the learning and experience of local financial intermediaries that can 
be passed on to their successors. 
Possible evidence that the differences may have been generated by 
something like h·ust comes from two further panel regressions, which add 
the share of perpetual annuities in either 1740or1780 and look at its effect 
over the years 1840 to 1899. The annuity share turns out to have a large 
positive and significant coefficient in both regressions. A market in which 
all loans in 1780 were perpetual annuities had, other things being equal, a 
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58 percent higher per capita loan stock from 1840 to 1899; for the 1740 
annuity share, the impact was even higher-an 82 percentjun1p in the per 
capital stock (table 9.6, regressions 5 and 6). Regressions iun with the same 
annuity shares for longel' periods (when we unfortunately lack data on 
banks and wealth) lead to similar results (table 9.6, regressions 7 and 8). 
One might be tempted to interpret these findings as evidence that trust 
does have a lasting effect on financial mmkets. After all, that the annuity 
share in 1740 influences bo1rowing some 100 to 150 years later is a strik-
ing result, particulmly given that it comes from regressions hum 1840 to 
1899, when the relevant legal and political institutions me not changing. 
Conceivably-so the explanation might go-individuals might have been 
inclined to lend money out in pe1petual annuity contracts in those mar-
kets in which people had developed effective socia1 sanctions against 
potential defaulters. If so, perhaps the h·ust formed in these markets 
might have became a pererutlal factor in the local lending culture and thus 
persisted for generations. 
Yet though that interpretation may seem plausible at first glance, it has 
a fatal disadvantage: it cannot stand up to historical reality. In 1790, the 
French revolutiona1y government, which was falling short of revenue, 
embarked on an ambitious scheme to nationalize church properties and 
to issue paper currency (assignats) backed by the confiscated wealth 
(Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2000). The printing presses 
churned out so many reams of assignats that the currency lost 99 percent 
of its valt1e in five yeal's. All that would be of little importance save that 
for ancient legal reasons all loan conh·acts were nominal and thus not 
indexed against inflation. Essentially, the loan contracts took two forms. 
One was a term loan with a short, specified maturity, typica1ly tmder 
three years except in Paris. Lenders who had put out their n1oney in these 
conhacts were by and large able to get it back before the currency's value 
plunged. The second contract type, however, was the perpetual annuity, 
and repayment of the capital for these loans was at the discretion of the 
borrower, provided he continued to pay the interest due. For these con-
tracts, borrowers could wait as inflation eroded the currency and then 
repay their annuities in worthless paper. The lenders could do nothing to 
force repayment. Our estimates for Paris are that more than 90 percent of 
the perpetual annttlties were paid off and that the lenders lost on average 
75 percent of the prerevolutionary value of their inVestments. The infla-
tion, quite simply, was a dagger aimed at the trust shown by individuals 
who lent money out in annuities. The connection with trust is inescapable, 
because borrowers could have chosen not to l'epay in worthless assignats 
and then borne the full cost of their loans once the currency had been sta-
bilized. Although markets with high annuity shares before the revolution 
might have been places where hust was high, they should have had very 
low trust afterwards. 
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If trust were important, \Ve would expect lenders in markets with high 
annuity shares to shun lending after the revolution. But if that was how 
in any lenders acted, we should have observed exactly the opposite in the 
regression-namely, a coefficient that was large and negative. The posi-
tive coefficient thus begs explanation, but fortunately a simple alternative 
n1akes sense of our results. Mmkets with large annuity shru:es in 1740 wit-
nessed a great deal of lending in 1780 because they were the n1arkets with 
rnore wealth and demand for credit. If the revolution left the distribution 
of economic activity intact and informal cultural variables were unimpor-
tant, we would expect markets with big annuity shares to recover swiftly 
and to again have sizeable demand for credit after the revolution. And 
that is precisely what happened. Although bloodshed and tumult during 
the revolution slowed the recove1y, the redistribution of property (albeit 
considerable) was sudden and definitive and hence did not disrupt the 
economy greatly. The original property owners had little time to allow 
assets to depreciate much, and some of the church property that was 
auctioned off was actually converted to productive use-in particular, 
monastic buildings. The real economy quickly recovered and with it the 
large demand for loans in the markets with all the eighteenth-century 
annuities. With a delay, one that was a bit longer in Paris and otl1er cities 
where annuities were popular, so did the supply of loans. By 1807, the 
stock of outstanding debts had aheady climbed to 72 percent of its 1780 
value, if we use our figmes to extrapolate to France as a whole. 
This demand side story has an appealing consistency that the trust 
story lacks. For otherwise, we would have to believe that trust could 
somehow survive the social upheavals of an event like the French 
Revolution and persist without flinching for years--even though it was 
trust in annuities that had suffered the greatest damage from the revolu-
tionary inflation. What could make it through such tuimoil unbowed? It 
would simply be impossible for trust not to change. History mollllts a 
powerful argrnnent for persistent differences in demand and against dif-
ferences in trust. 
Conclusion 
When we began this inquil'y, we fumly believed that credit required trust 
and in pmticular that lenders had to hust bo1Towers, given that a debtor 
could affect a creditor's ability to recover his capital in many ways. In ear-
lier work, we had emphasized the importance of informal institutions and 
human capital development in explaining the growth of lending in Paris 
(Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2000). In extending our research 
to encompass not just Paris but a large sample of cities and towns as well, 
we encountered some startling differences in the institutions that sus-
tained lending (Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2004). It was our 
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ambition to com1ectour analysis of institution with the study of trust and 
trustworthiness. 
Yet, to our smprise, we found that trust was neither persistent nor 
firmly linked to conventional measures of social capital. At first glance, 
this result seems abslll·d, given the importance accorded to h·ust in finan-
cial markets. It seen1s doubly absurd given the weight many scholars 
have put on the role of informal networks in financial affairs. It may even 
seem ridiculous, given the e1nphasis individuals active in financial mar-
kets have always placed on trust and on reputation, After all, trust or its 
abuse has been advanced to explain aggregate fluctuations (in financial 
crises stemming h·om loss of confidence), individual success (of bankers 
such as Rothschild or Morgan, whose fortunes were built on trust), and 
individual failure (individuals denied credit because of a lack of trust) 
(Hoffman, Postel-Vi.nay, and Rosenthal 2007). That seemed hue as far 
back as !:he eighteenth century and remains true today. Yet the contradic-
tion here is more apparent than real. Although trust is critical, it is not 
hard to manufacture in adequate amounts in economies and societies that 
are not pathological. fu the previous chapter of this volume, we can actu-
ally see the process involved, at least in the case of the United States. As a 
result, from a statistical perspective, trust in the financial arena is an inter-
mediate variable that evolves rather quickly, at least from the sort of gen-
erational perspective that we have been investigating, in response to 
shocks to the demand for credit.24 
Problems of trust do of course arise when societies have severe problems 
of racketeering. Indeed, in such societies-southern Italy, for example--
participation in formal financial markets may \.Veil make one a target for 
thieves, extortionists, or embezzlers. What then should policymakers in 
such societies do? No policy they adopt will change an individual's hust 
unless it attacks the ultimate cause of the lack of trust-namely, racketeer-
ing. In this instance, as in cases of civil war or racial and ethnic discrimi-
nation, capital will spurn financial markets and flow only through peculiar 
channels. Individuals without access to these channels may well be shut 
out, and attempts to eliminate mistrust without treating the larger social 
problem will have little effect. 
In economies that have escaped such intractable social and political 
problems, the p1"0blems for policymakers are different, even if the societies 
are poor. Capital markets in such economies may simply be underdevel-
oped, and the historical experience of France and other countries in the 
North Atlantic suggest that in this case two sets of institutions are worth 
nurturing: those that encourage savings and those that boost the flow of 
infonnation between bo1rowers and lenders. Savings are important 
because even today most loans go to individuals or firms that have accu-
mulated assets that can be used as collateral. Even unsecured debt is usu-
ally taken on by individuals and finns that are already rich. An important 
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way for countries to increase lending is thus to reduce the cost 0£ saving in 
the form of financial assets; once individuals have acctunulated such assets, 
they can leverage then1. Savings of this sort does require that individuals 
believe that their wealth is secure. That belief, which could be called hust 
in formal institutions, seems to have been prevalent early on in France. 
The importance of institutions that help convey inforn1ation is also 
clear, for if information flows are blocked, lenders cannot detect borrow-
ers' misbehavior, and everyone will be encouraged to take advantage of 
everyone else. Reduced information can then quickly translate into gen-
eralized distrust. The institutions that facilitate the flow of information 
can thus heighten trust. If a cotmtry has both these institutions and the 
ones that foster savings, then our evidence suggests that the more infor-
mal institutions affecting trust will fall into place on theil' own. 
Appendix: The Model 
Our model abstracts from an economy in which the number of markets 
for credit is finite, and each n1arket is large relative to the loans that any 
h1dividual makes. It assumes N such markets, the j-th market having a 
continuum of individuals of positive mass mi and the sum of the mi equal-
ing 1. Tite mi are measures of the relative size of the markets, which would 
be relative populations if the number of actors in each market were finite. 
Capital flows from market to market as individuals borrow and lend; the 
equilibrium condition for the interest rate i is that average excess demand 
for loans is zero for the entire economy: 
E,m,[(1- G,(i))T,E,(wlr > 1)/(1 + i)- G,(i)E,(wlr < i)] ~ 0 
where the sum is taken over all N markets, Gi is the distribution of entre-
preneurial rates of return talent in market j, Ti> 0 is trust in Ute market, 
and Ei (wl r > i) is the expected value of wealth in the market for individ-
uals with r > i. This expected value is calculated with respect to the mar-
ket's distribution of wealth Fi. Because we assume that the distribution of 
wealth and entrepreneurial talent are independent in each market, this 
condition becomes 
E1m, [(1- G1 (i))T;E; (w)/(1 + i)- G; (i)E1 (w)J ~ 0 (Al) 
We assume that the distribution functions G1 are absolutely continuous 
and that there is a maximum feasible rate of return R > 0 such that Gi (R) = 1 
for all markets j. The expression on the left hand side of Al, which we \.Vill 
call D, is therefore negative £or i =Rand positive for when i = 0. Because 
Dis a continuous function of i, there must therefore be at least one inter-
est rate i* for \Vhich Al holds. 
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This i* will be W1ique if there is at least one marketj for which G1 (i*) < l, 
for then D, which is nonincreasing in i, will actually be decreasing in a 
neighborhood of i*. If we assume that sud1 a market exists and that the 
density functions for the G1 are all continuous, we can apply the implicit 
function theorem to i* as a function of Tk, the measure of trust in u1arket 
k. The equjlibriurninterest rate i* will then be an increasing function of Tk. 
An increase in Tk will raise the average supply of funds ni1 G1 (i) E1 (w) from 
other markets (j :/: k) and reduce the average demand in these n1arkets.1ts 
effect on the demand in market k, however, will be ambiguous, because 
the rising interest rate may offset the effect of greater h·ust. 
For our regressions, we are concerned with per-capita borrowing in 
each market, which in our model is (1-G1 (i*)) ~E1 (w)/(1 + i*). The log-
arithm of this expression is the dependent variable in our regressions, and 
to a first order approximation it will be a linear function of the interest 
rate, average wealth, and our indexes of den1and and trust, if we assume 
thatG;and 1/are continuously differentiable functions of the demand and 
trust indices. 
Sources for Data 
Thanks to generous support from the Russell Sage Foundation, we have 
managed to gather data on more than 200,000 loans spread out over 
160 years and 108 separate markets in six cross sections: 1740, 1780, 1807, 
1840, 1865, and 1899. The markets were chosen to fo1ma stratified sample 
of French towns and cities according to their population. The sample 
includes Paris, tlu·ee other large urban centers (Lyon, Rauen, and Toulouse), 
thirteenn1edium-sized cities (populations between20,000 and 50,000, such 
as Amiens), and forty smaller cities (populations between5,000 and 20,000), 
and sixty-one towns (populations under 5,000). Our evidence, it should be 
stressed, comes not simply from the cities and towns -themselves but from 
the su1Totu1ding counh'yside as well. 
In addition to the credit data, we have also collected data on financial 
inte1mediades, populations, economic development, banktuptcies, wealth, 
inequality, hwnan capital, and social capital in each of the 108 n1arkets. 
Here we describe our sources and how we estimated the per capita stock 
of outstanding debt in each market. 
To estimate, we used records of loan registration that survive as far back 
as the early eighteenth cenhrry. Lenders had to have t11eir Joans registered 
with a local registration office and pay a tax on the transaction. If they did 
not do so, they would have difficulty enforcing their loans in court in case 
of default, and they therefore had a powerful incentive to register the loans 
and report truthfully the tenns of the loan contract. The registration offices 
were located in towns and cities but registered transactions for the sur-
rounding countryside as well. Although the reg1stration was reorganized 
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late in the French R_evolution, the nature of ~e tax and the size of the areas 
covered by each office hardly changed over time.2" Typically each office cov-
ered an area that V\'as nearly the same as a nineteenth-century French can-
ton, a small administrative unit averaging some 150 square kilometers. 
For each market and cross section, the registration records gave us the 
number of new loans made, the types of loans, their size, and, in most 
cases, their duration. In the eighteenth century, data on durations in cer-
tain types of loans had to be gathered directly from the original loan con-
tracts, which survive in the ardtlves of notaries, the legal officials who 
drew up loan conh·acts and arranged loans,26 
To calculate the outstanding stock of debt, we took the new loans reg-
istered in each market in the years of our six cross sections and n1ultiplied 
the value of each loan by its duration. The sum of these products is our 
estimate for the loan stock. The calculation assumes that the market is in 
a steady state, but a detailed investigation of the credit market in Paris 
shows this method is a good approximation. We could also calculate the 
fraction of loans of each type and single out particulat sorts of debt,such 
as annuities. 
The dependent variable in our regressions was the logarithm of the out-
standing stock per person, which we calculated by dividing the outstand-
ing loan stock by the population of the district the office served. 27 Our 
regressions also used the population of the city where the registration 
office was located as an explanatory variable; again, this population was 
not the same as that used to compute the per capita loan stock 
As for our other explanatory variables, the wealth meastU'e came from 
property tax records in 1840, 1864, and 1899. Tax records and the Bottin 
Almnnad1-a national guide that provided commercial, administrative, 
and personal information for all French cities, including those eligible to 
vote-also provided our measure of inequality, the proportion of tax-
payers who had enough assets to be eligible to vote in 1840 (Bottin and 
Tynna 1840).28 Literacy rates came from draft records for the years 1820 to 
1830, which in addition furnished our two measures of draft resistance.29 
The religious measures of social capital tvere graciously provided by 
Timothy Tackett; they come from his data as published in tl1e atlas of 
Oaude Langlois and colleagues (1996}. The judicial measures of social cap 
ital (the number of verdicts against defendants :in civil and criminal trials 
in 1840, 1865, and 1899) come from Compte general de l'adndnistration de la 
justice ctiminelle en France pendant!' an nee 1840 (Ministere de la Justice 1841), 
table LXXVI; Compte general de l'adniinistration de la justice criminelle en 
Francepe11dm1t l'annee 1865 (M:inistere de la Justice 1866), table LXXVID; and 
Compte general de I' administration de ln justice criminelle en France pendant 
l'annee 1898 (Ministere de la Justice 1899), table :XXX. 
Finally, the number of banks was taken from the Bottin Abnanach or 
Annunire for the years of our nineteenth-century cross sections. If bank 
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data was unavailable for that exact year, we used figures for the nearest 
available year: data from 1829for1807, from 1862for 1865, and from 1898 
for 1899 (Bottin and Tynna 1829, 1840; Bottin 1862, 1898). 
I. 
Notes 
Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Rafaelia Nanetti argue that social cap-
ital in different parts of Italy has ancient historical roots; it thus must change 
very slowly, if at all (1993). More recently, however, Edward :tvliguel, Paul 
Gertler, and David Levine used repeated surveys to sho\V that social capital 
does seem to have changed during industrialization in Indonesia (2006). 
2. Although Miguel, Gertler, and Levine explored changes in social capital dur-
ing industrialization, they did not investigate the relationship behveen social 
capital and the sort of trust in financial markets that is the subject of this 
chapter (2006). They did exantine the number of credit cooperatives, but for 
them it is simply one of several measm·es of social capital, and not an index 
of financial trust. 
3. The entrepreneur's return 1· could of course be related to his education, 
which a wealthy entrepreneur could purchase, but we can control for that in 
our regressions. A more complicated dynamic model could also introduce a 
correlation between wand r. 
4. Unregistered debt included informal consumption loans and certain forms 
of merchant credit that were not subject to the registration require1nents. For 
an individual merchant, the mercantile credit could be important, but 
because only a snmll number of people took out such loans, they would 
count for very little in our calculation of the per capita debt stock that is our 
dependent variable. They would count for even less given that such debt 
was short term (typically ninety days or less) and our dependent variable (as 
\Ve explain in the appendix) takes into account the duration of the loans. As 
for the informal conswnption loans, they too would be small, given the 
incentives that lenders had to register anything sizeable. 
5. These examples come from the registration office records for Dun-sur-Auron 
at the Archives departementales du Cher, 1 Q 4025 CTanuary 6, 1840). 
6. Many of the original term loan contracts in the notarial archives also omit-
ted the interest rate, simply saying, for instance, that a borrower owed a par-
ticular amount due on such and such a date. 
7. The differences in interest rates could also reflect risk premiunlS and fees, 
which are not part of our simple model. 
8. We used total loan stock rather than the volume of new loans because the 
loan stock comes closer to capturing the notion of total borrowing that is at 
the heart of the model. Imagine, for instance, that an entrepreneur can fLmd 
a three-year construction project to build a new factory by taking out a $1,000 
loan for three years, or by taking out three successive $1,000 loans, each for 
one year. If we were only taking into account the volume of ne\V loans in a 
single year (which is essentially lvhat we would be doing in a one-year cross 
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section), then one of the one-year $1,000 loans would count for as much as 
three-year $1,000 loan; if, however, we weight by duration (as Jn the compu-
tation of loan stock), then the three-year loan is worth three times as much. 
9. TI1e interest rate will not figure in the cross-sectional regressions because it 
will be constant in any single cross section. It will enter the panel regression 
via both the term ln(l - G; (i*)) and the te1m ln(l + i*). To a first-order approx-
imation, we can expand ln(l - G; (i*)) as a linear ftmction of ln(l + i*) and 
other variables, and thus the interest rate will appear in the panel regression 
simply as a coefficient times In(l + i*), which we can capture by using time 
dummies in the panel regression. Because (1 + i*) is very close to i', we could 
also simply insert the average interest rate in the regressions. 
10. Although one can try to test the persistence of trust by running successive 
cross-sectional regressions for different years, the results could well be mis-
leading, because the effects of the w1 could be mixed in the constant term 
with the impact ofva1yinginterest rates and other time dependent variables. 
One could therefore not tell for sure whether trust was changing. In the 
panel regression, the interest rate and the other time-varying variables can 
be captured by dummies for the periods. 
11. If it is left out of the regressions, there is of course the problem of omitted 
vaiiables bias, as \\Then any other variables are omitted. 
12. This short-term bank credit was usually not registered with the tax offices and 
so does not figure in our data. But as we have expl<rined, the omission is not 
likely to affect our per capita loan stocks y; significantly, because the mercan-
tile loans were short term and only a relatively few merchants lvere involved. 
13. AB we explain, finding useable voting data was difficult, and it is even 
harder to gather reliable data on guilds. The sort of information about asso-
ciations often used to measure social capital was not available until the 1870s 
or later. Conceivably, distance from a given market to Paris ntlght be consid-
ered a proxy for social capital, because Pa.tis was the source of political and 
cultural change, but it was not correlated in any plausible way with our 
social capital measures and in any case had no significant effect when 
inserted in our panel regressions. Finally, we do have some evidence on pro-
fessional and familial ties linking borrowers and lenders in a few selected 
markets; such ties {which \Vere important in Paris in the seventeenth cen-
tury, though not thereafter) might be considered yet another proxy for social 
capital. Gathering similar information for even a reasonable sample of our 
markets, though, would have been prohibitively time consuming. 
14. Donald Sutherland addresses the relationship between the oath and the tlSe 
of birth conh·ol through the effect the French Revolution had on Catholicism 
(2003, 193-94, 242--45, 345). In unpublished research, David Weir (personal 
communication to Philip T. Hoffman) has also noticed the connection between 
the oath and birth control. AB Sutherland pointed out, the revolutionary cam-
paign against h'aditional Catholicism was far from uniform, and as a result, 
the correlation between rejecting the revolutionary oath and subsequent 
attachment to Catholicism is not a perfect one (2003, 186-98). But there is still 
a coITelation, 
I 
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For other examples of this social rift as a backdrop in novels, see Stendhal 
(1830/1963), Le rouge et le twir. The divisions here may in fact have reached 
back to eighteenth centmy (see, for instance, Vovelle 1973; Norberg 1985). 
Balzac had himself worked in the p1inHng business and he had made sev-
eral extended visits to friends in Angouleme {1843/1990). He was also so 
attentive to detail that he even asked his friends there for information about 
place nan1es and a city map, which he completed by reading guides to 
Angouleme. 
We leave alternative elections for further research, in particular, those for 
the Etats Generaux in 1789 and various general elections during the Third 
Republic (on the May 1849 elections, see Dupeux 1962; Vigier 1963). The 
detailed results for 1849 are in the Archives nationales, C 1467-578. 
Conscription can also be undermined by inequality, which is at least in part 
an economic variable. In an unequal society, average wealth will be a poor 
measure of collateral, because many people will have little or no collateral, 
and per capita lending may therefore be less than what the average wealth 
implies. The expected effect, again, will be a negative relationship between 
resistance to conscription and lending, though it may be in part economic. 
19. Our panel regressions always use a random-effects specification when we 
have an explanatory variable (such as a measure of trust or social capital) 
that does not vary across time. Otherwise, we used a fixed-effects specifica-
tion, though in son1e cases we have also shown the results with a random-
effects specification for the sake of comparison. Fixed effects have certain 
advantages over random effects, but they are inappropriate when explana-
tory variables do not vary over time. The random-effects estimator assumes 
that the time invariant social capital or trust measures are not correlated with 
the economic variables; that may have been a problem for our trust measure 
annuity sltare 1740, for our social capital measure electio11 t11rno11t 1849, and 
for verdicts when its value in 1840 is used in a random-effects regression in 
table 9.4 (regression 6). On the other hand, one can argue that the random-
effects estimator is more appropriate for all of our regressions because vve 
are dealing with a sample of markets. 
20. One might worry that the social cap ital measures could be jointly significant, 
but if they are all added to a random effects regression for the years 1840 to 
1899, the null hypothesis that they jointly have no effect cannot be rejected 
at the 10 percent level (P"' 0.1038). The test used self-mutilate rather than Jail 
to report to measure draft resistance, 
21. Because Miguel, Gertler, and Levine found out that migration eroded social 
capital in Indonesia, one might wonder whether our panel regressions 
would change if we took migration into account (2006). We can do so in a 
crude way by using changes in city populations as a yardstick of migration 
and adding an interaction term with our measures of social capital. If we do 
so, the results are unchanged, and the coefficients of the social capital mea-
sures are all statistically insignificant. 
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Wealth restrictions on male suffrage in France ended in 1848; earlier in the 
decade, only one of forty adult males had been eligible to vote. 
Randon1 effects regressions (table 9.6, regressions 2 and 4) also point to 
sizeable w1• 
Our claim here parallels 'vhat Miguel, Gertler, and Levine found about the 
relationship between industrialization and social capital (2006). 
Before the revolution, the regish·ation was known as the co11ir8le des actes; 
after the revolution, it was the enregistrement des actes civils publics. 
In a small number of cases, where records were destroyed or unavailable, 
we had to seek other data in the notarial archives or in judicial records. That 
was the case, for exatnple, in Caen, where the records were destroyed dur-
ing the Normandy invasion, and in Paris, where registration did not exist 
in the eighteenth century. 
For the population of the area served by each office, we used the canton pop-
ulation, or its geographic equivalent in the eighteenth century, which we cal-
culated by sunmtlng the populations for the corresponding parishes (in the 
eighteenth century) or communes (in the nineteenth century). We thank 
Claude Motte for graciously making thls population data available. 
Unfortunately 1840 was the only year when the Bottin gave the list of tax-
payers eligible to vote. 
The sources here are Jean-Paul Aron, Paul Dumont, and Emmanuel Le Roy 
Ladurie (1972) and the Comptes 1111mfriq11es et sommnires sur /es jermes gens for 
each deparhnent, which are in the Archives nationales, F9150-261. 
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